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This book contains twelve papers which were originally presented at a conference hosted by 
the University of Chicago in 2003.  This collection is a very good example of how research on 
an ancient author should be done.  The remarkable quality of this volume is the result of the 
choice of bringing together an impressive group of scholars—some of the contributors are 
amongst the most distinguished scholars of Roman philosophy and literature. 
The purpose of this book is to reflect on Foucault’s famous thesis that Seneca is a philo-
sopher who is particularly concerned with the “care of the self,” i.e., the investigation of the 
“technologies” (i.e., practices) that are most suitable to lead a person to moral and spiritual im-
provement.  Some of the contributors (i.e., Inwood, Ker, and Long) of Seneca and the Self expli-
citly concentrate on Foucault’s interpretation of Seneca; others keep Foucault’s reading of Se-
neca in the background and analyze, more or less directly, Seneca’s elusive notion of the self.  
In this review, I will devote more attention to the articles which explicitly discuss Foucault’s 
theory since this section of the book is probably of greater interest for the readers of this 
journal.  Seneca and the Self is divided into four parts, an introduction and three sections which 
approach Seneca’s notion of the self from a philosophical, cultural, and literary perspective 
respectively.  The text’s interdisciplinary approach is one of its greatest merits since it does jus-
tice of the complexity of Seneca’s corpus of works which consists not only of philosophical 
texts but also of tragedies and satires.  The diversity of Seneca’s literary production has always 
constituted a challenge for any scholar who has attempted to consider his thought in a holistic 
way—Seneca and the Self offers an important contribution to the understanding of the relations 
between Seneca’s very diverse works.   
In the introduction the editors effectively outline both the merits (i.e., the interdiscipli-
nary approach and the discussion between different evaluations of Seneca’s notion of the self) 
and the content of the book.  The editors also present the key difficulty involved in the study 
of Seneca’s notion of the self: in Seneca’s works the notion of the self is not clearly outlined, in 
spite of the many texts in which he seems, as Foucault shows, to reflect on how to care for 
one’s self.  On the whole, Seneca and the Self shows that Foucault’s interpretation of Seneca pre-
sents a very serious exegetical difficulty.  In the History of Sexuality (vol. 3) Foucault argues 
that the care for the self was a constant preoccupation among the philosophers who lived du-
ring the Imperial Age, regardless of their philosophical affiliations.  Foucault’s inclusion of 
authors such as Seneca in the list of those who developed strategies to care for the self is pro-
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blematic since his affiliation to Stoicism makes it difficult to understand what the self is for 
him.  Different from Platonism in which the self is clearly identified with man’s soul which is 
his real essence, Stoic psychology does not seem to make room for the self.  The Stoic notion of 
man’s commanding faculty (i.e., hēgemonikon) does not, indeed, carry the sense of individuality 
which seems to be required to develop a notion of the self.  In the introduction to Seneca and 
the Self the editors suggest an attractive solution to such an exegetical difficulty: Seneca’s no-
tion of the self is “not ontological but rather ethical, and even there more rhetorical than 
doctrinal.” (4)  According to this interpretation, Seneca seems to be interested (i) not in asses-
sing what the self is from an ontological or psychological perspective, but (ii) in examining a 
basic feature of human existence, i.e. the concern for one’s moral and spiritual condition.  The 
exegetical difficulty of assessing what Seneca’s notion of the self is and the solution suggested 
by the editors are explored in great detail throughout Seneca and the Self.   
The basic difficulty posed by Seneca’s notion of self is directly tackled by A. A. Long’s 
article “Seneca and the Self: Why Now?” Initially, Long shows that Foucault’s study of Sene-
ca’s notion of the self has two main merits: 1) it contributes to deepening our understanding of 
the Roman author; 2) it brings to our attention a way of thinking about the self which con-
stitutes a valuable alternative to the Cartesian idea of the self that is still fairly prominent in 
our culture.  In the second part of his article, Long acknowledges the difficulty of placing a re-
flection on the self within Stoic psychology and proposes an insightful model of the structure 
of the self.  Long’s model is not explicitly presented by either Seneca or other Stoic philo-
sophers, but it (i) may have been tacitly employed by Seneca and other Stoic thinkers or, at the 
very least, (ii) is in harmony with the basic tenets of Stoic psychology.  Long indicates that it is 
possible to distinguish within a human being between (i) an “occurrent subjective self” which 
consists of a person’s present thoughts and emotions and  (ii) a “normative self” which is what 
a person should aspire to become.  On this reading, Seneca’s re-current analyses on how to 
care for the self can be regarded as a sort of roadmap which indicates how an individual 
should proceed in order to abandon his “occurrent” self and acquire the “normative” self.  
Long’s analysis of Seneca’s notion of the self is an effective way to (i) follow up Foucault’s 
intuition that Seneca does have a notion of the self and (ii) offer the theoretical framework to 
understand how to place Seneca’s frequent analyses of the self within the Stoic philosophical 
framework. 
B. Inwood’s essay, “Seneca and Self-assertion,” is the most critical of Foucault’s reading 
of Seneca amongst the contributions contained in Seneca and the Self.  Inwood’s primary target 
is the view (which he attributes to Foucault) that Seneca innovates on previous treatments of 
the self by Stoic and Platonic philosophers.  Inwood shows very persuasively that that there is 
no distinctive novelty in Seneca’s ontology of the human mind.  This reading, however, raises 
some important exegetical issues.  The first is whether Foucault really thinks that Seneca’s no-
tion of the self introduces a novelty in Stoic psychology.  In his first extensive treatment of the 
self in the History of Sexuality Foucault mentions Seneca together with many other Epicurean, 
Stoic, and Platonic philosophers without stressing Seneca’s originality but simply presenting 
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him as one of the protagonists of the “discovery of the self.”1  As for Foucault’s analysis of the 
notion of the self, he seems to be interested in describing the ways in which authors of the 
Imperial Age reflected on how to proceed in order to improve one’s intellectual, spiritual, and 
emotional condition.  The possible problem which Foucault’s interpretation presents is not 
that it attributes to Seneca a view that he never held—as it is suggested by Inwood—but that 
he may have failed to consider what the theoretical ground for the care of the self is.  In the 
second part of his article, Inwood offers a very penetrative analysis of Seneca’s texts which 
aims to show that, contrary to what Foucault claims, Seneca’s recurrent use of reflective pro-
nouns is not evidence that he developed a sense of the self.  Inwood argues very persuasively 
that Seneca’s self-reflecting language is a literary device which aims to create a literal persona, 
a moral exemplum of the moral principles Seneca advocates.  Inwood’s interpretation has the 
merit of showing the necessity to recognize the difference between Seneca-the-author and the 
image of Seneca that we get from his works.  This reading, however, raises the further pro-
blem of assessing what motivated Seneca-the-author to portray himself in a particular way rat-
her than in another.  It can be made the argument—which Foucault may have endorsed—that 
Seneca-the-author’s goal in portraying a “fictional Seneca” is therapeutic: his fictional self-
portrait may allow him to reflect, individuate, and objectify some of his fears and aspirations. 
In “Seneca and Selfhood: Integration and Disintegration” C. Gill explores the difficult-
ties involved in defining what, according to Seneca, the self is.  Gill concentrates on the diffi-
culties concerning Seneca’s notion of the self and its unity that are raised by the descriptions of 
the struggles that Medea and Phaedra—as they are portrayed by Seneca in his tragedies—
experience when choosing what course of action they should take.  Gill addresses this diffi-
culty by developing a very useful model of the structure of the self that is not too dissimilar to 
the one offered by Long in the first article of Seneca and the Self.  Gill suggests that it is possible 
to distinguish between a “natural self” and an “actual self.” The former captures how human 
beings should be if they were to follow their nature (i.e., reason) completely; the latter indi-
cates the state that human beings are in when they conduct their existence in a way that is not 
wholly rational.  In the light of this distinction, Gill argues that Seneca’s descriptions of Medea 
and Phaedra can be interpreted as dramatic illustrations of the struggle between their “na-
tural” and the “actual” selves.  In Seneca’s philosophical works, Gills claims, we have the de-
scription (i) not of the struggle between the “natural” and the “actual” self portrayed in the 
tragedies, but (ii) of the process which allows human beings to integrate these two selves.  Gill 
calls this process oikeiôsis (i.e., affiliation) and describes it as a natural but challenging process.  
Gill’s article should be taken very seriously by any scholar of Foucault since it does a wonder-
ful job in filling some of the exegetical gaps of Foucault’s interpretation of Seneca.  Gill’s dis-
tinction between “natural” and “actual” self and his analysis of oikeiôsis offer the theoretical 
justification for Seneca’s interest in how we should proceed to care for the self.  Gill’s article 
has the further merit of explaining with great efficacy the difference between Seneca’s notion 
of selfhood and the one that is common in Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy.  In Carte-
sian and post-Cartesian philosophy the self is indentified with a person’s self-consciousness, 
                                                 
1
 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self, in The History of Sexuality, vol. 3, translated by Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage books, 1990), 37-69. 
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individuality, and subjectivity; in Seneca the “natural” self is the state that all human beings 
experience when they act and feel in complete accordance with reason. 
Nussbaum’s “Stoic Laughter: Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis” concludes the section that in-
vestigates Seneca’s notion of self from a “philosophical perspective.”  Nussbaum deals with 
Seneca’s notion of the self indirectly by reflecting on the therapeutic role of laughter and satire.  
Initially, Nussbaum presents a very useful outline of three basic kinds of laughter: 1) the 
vulgar and mindless laughter which is effectively illustrated by the “frat boy”; 2) the “Stoic 
and Cynic” laughter which has a therapeutic goal and occurs when a person realizes the dis-
crepancy between philosophical values and the values of ordinary people; 3) the “Aristo-
phanic laughter” in which we assist at the comic celebration of the human body and its needs.  
In the second part of her article Nussbaum examines the difficulty of classifying the laughter 
that we encounter in Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis.  Through a thoughtful and insightful analysis of 
Seneca’s text Nussbaum shows that Apocolocyntosis presents a particular type of laughter 
which is centered on the notion of fastidium (i.e., “disgust,” “revulsion at contamination.”)  The 
disgust that Seneca describes in the Apocolocyntosis has, Nussbaum argues convincingly, the 
therapeutic effect of exposing life-styles and behaviours that a student of philosophy should 
feel compelled to reject.  This article may be taken to support the idea that activities such as 
reading and writing can crucially contribute to the process of caring for the self—an idea that 
Foucault strongly endorsed.2 
The section on Roman culture begins with a stimulating essay by E. Asmis: “Seneca on 
fortune and the kingdom of god.” Amis offers a fascinating analysis of the originality of Sene-
ca’s depiction of fortune.  Different to most Stoic philosophers who recommend their fol-
lowers to develop indifference towards fortune and her gifts, Seneca advocates engaging in a 
heroic fight against fortune.  Amis’s original interpretation of Seneca shows that we can find in 
the Roman thinker the seeds of the Renaissance ideal of the homo faber fortunae suae.  Scholars 
of Foucault will find this article useful since it shows how the activity of caring for oneself was 
considered by authors such as Seneca to be a dramatic and agonistic process. 
C. Edwards’ “Free yourself! Slavery, freedom, and the self in Seneca’s Letters” is an 
exemplary article which offers a very good example of how the knowledge of the historical 
and social context in which an author operates is crucial for an accurate understanding of his 
works.  Edwards investigates how in his Letters Seneca often employs the images of the master 
and the slave to illustrate the challenges a person encounters when he tries to free himself 
from the slavery of passions and become master of his moral and spiritual self.  Edwards 
shows that in order to fully appreciate the way Seneca uses the images of the master and the 
slave it is necessary to recognize the complex dynamics which were at play between slaves 
and masters in Seneca’s time.  The dialectic between the images of the master and the slave is 
used by Seneca, Edwards explains very persuasively, to illustrate the process that philo-
sophers engage in when they abandon the self which is attached to external things and em-
brace the “real” self.  The study of the way Seneca uses the images of the master and the slave 
to describe the process of acquisition of the “real” self offers further textual support to Fou-
                                                 
2 Michel Foucault, “Self Writing,” in Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity, and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984, vol. 1, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 207-222. 
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cault’s interpretation of Seneca as a philosopher who is concerned with understanding how to 
properly care for the self. 
J. Ker’s “Seneca on Self-examination: On Anger 3.36” concentrates on a famous Senecan 
text on which Foucault’s interpretation of the Roman thinker heavily relies.  Notoriously, Fou-
cault considers On Anger 3.36 as an effective example of a particular “technology of the self” 
which Seneca employs to examine his own moral progress towards a “conversion to self.”  Ker 
thoroughly examines Foucault’s reading of On Anger 3.36 and highlights its merits as well as 
its problems.  Then, Ker offers an extremely sophisticated literal analysis of On Anger 3.36 
which leads him to show that the philosophical content of Seneca’s text is closely connected to 
the particular literary style he employs.  According to Ker, the care in choosing images or 
terms which effectively capture a philosophical idea that Seneca’s text displays constitutes a 
specific “technology” which Seneca employs to connect with his true self.  The activity of re-
flecting on how a general philosophical idea can be effectively conveyed requires an author, 
Ker thinks, to internalize such an idea and to connect it with his own self.  On a more general 
note, Ker’s article seems to correctly grasp the spirit of Foucault’s reading of the Ancient 
world.  Foucault aimed not to offer a definitive analysis of certain phenomena of the Ancient 
world, but to bring to our attention aspects of Antiquity which had been previously neglected 
in order to stimulate further research of the kind pursued in works such as Seneca and the Self. 
S. Bartsch’s “Senecan metaphor and Stoic self-instruction” can be considered as the 
ideal continuation of Ker’s article.  Ker reflected on the importance of analyzing Seneca’s lan-
guage; Bartsch concentrates on a specific aspect of Seneca’s language, i.e. his frequent use of 
metaphors. Traditionally, Seneca’s fondness for metaphor has puzzled scholars who regarded 
with skepticism the use of metaphor in philosophical works.  Bartsch considers the inter-
pretations of Seneca’s use of metaphor by Inwood and Mireille Armisen-Marchetti as indica-
tive of two possible ways of reflecting on this issue.  Inwood is unsympathetic of Seneca’s re-
current use of metaphor since he considers that conveying a philosophical idea through a 
metaphor contains always the risk of distorting it.  He argues that a serious exegesis of Sene-
ca’s works has to unveil the philosophical meaning that a metaphor conceals or skews.  On the 
contrary, Mireille Armisen-Marchetti explores the pedagogical purposes of expressing philo-
sophical ideas through metaphors; she argues that metaphors can facilitate the expression of 
abstract ideas by overcoming the limitations of human language.  Bartsch acknowledges his 
debt to this second interpretation and argues that Seneca’s use of metaphor has a self-
therapeutic goal.  Bartsch indicates that, in order to design a metaphor which can effectively 
express a specific philosophical view, an author has to internalize the doctrine in question and 
to relate it to his experience.  In other words, the effort of choosing the appropriate metaphor 
requires an author to gain an in-depth knowledge of a theory.  On this reading, the process of 
choosing which metaphor can best convey a particular philosophical idea can be a very effec-
tive aid, Bartsch argues, towards moral progress.  Although Bartsch does not directly engage 
with Foucault’s interpretation of Seneca his analysis of the therapeutic purpose of Senecan me-
taphors is very close to Foucault’s idea that Ancient authors regarded the activity of writing as 
a “technology of the self.”  
The three articles which compose the last section of Seneca and the Self explore the re-
lation between Seneca’s tragedies and his philosophical works.  In “Seneca and the denial of 
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the self” A. Schiesaro argues that the tragedies contain an analysis of the self as constituted by 
reason as well as passion which is ultimately incompatible with the way in which the self is 
presented in Seneca’s philosophical works.  In “Seneca and Tragedy’s Reason” D. Wray shows 
that Seneca’s philosophical production cannot be separated from his tragedies since they are 
both crucial for the articulation of his thought.  Seneca’s detached, almost clinical analysis of 
human beings that we get from the philosophical works is balanced by his tragedies’ graphic 
descriptions of the brutalities that human beings commit when they are in the grip of extreme 
passions.  The article which concludes Seneca and the Self (i.e., A. Bush, “Dissolution of the Self 
in the Senecan Corpus”) also focuses on the relation between Seneca’s philosophical writings 
and his tragedies.  Busch outlines the difference between the analysis of death and the afterlife 
that we find in Seneca’s philosophical works and that which emerges from his tragedies.  In 
his philosophical works Seneca proposes a fairly comforting idea of death which is described 
as either the end of all sufferings or the transition to a blessed afterlife.  On the contrary, in the 
tragedies Seneca has a dark view of death which is portrayed as the transition to an afterlife 
characterized by sufferings that are even greater than the ones we can experience in this life. 
In conclusion, the collection Seneca and the Self offers a stimulating debate on a challen-
ging topic of Seneca’s philosophy and is a telling example of the lasting effect that Foucault’s 
studies has had on the scholarship in Ancient philosophy and literature. 
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